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rsync: backport bug fixes 

Including CVE fixes for:
CVE-2024-12084
CVE-2024-12085
CVE-2024-12086
CVE-2024-12087
CVE-2024-12088
CVE-2024-12747

The patch list is based on rsync_3.2.7-1+deb12u2 from Debian.

Signed-off-by: Tianling Shen <cnsztl@immortalwrt.org>
This commit is contained in:
Tianling Shen 2025-03-08 17:27:26 +08:00 committed by Tianling Shen
parent d812d91706
commit 01338963f9
15 changed files with 884 additions and 1 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
net/rsync/Makefile
View File

@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=rsync
PKG_VERSION:=3.2.7
PKG_RELEASE:=1
PKG_RELEASE:=2
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://download.samba.org/pub/$(PKG_NAME)/src

138
net/rsync/patches/001-Some-checksum-buffer-fixes.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
From 0902b52f6687b1f7952422080d50b93108742e53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2024 22:55:29 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Some checksum buffer fixes.
- Put sum2_array into sum_struct to hold an array of sum2 checksums
that are each xfer_sum_len bytes.
- Remove sum2 buf from sum_buf.
- Add macro sum2_at() to access each sum2 array element.
- Throw an error if a sums header has an s2length larger than
xfer_sum_len.
---
io.c | 3 ++-
match.c | 8 ++++----
rsync.c | 5 ++++-
rsync.h | 4 +++-
sender.c | 4 +++-
5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/io.c
+++ b/io.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ extern int read_batch;
extern int compat_flags;
extern int protect_args;
extern int checksum_seed;
+extern int xfer_sum_len;
extern int daemon_connection;
extern int protocol_version;
extern int remove_source_files;
@@ -1977,7 +1978,7 @@ void read_sum_head(int f, struct sum_str
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
sum->s2length = protocol_version < 27 ? csum_length : (int)read_int(f);
- if (sum->s2length < 0 || sum->s2length > MAX_DIGEST_LEN) {
+ if (sum->s2length < 0 || sum->s2length > xfer_sum_len) {
rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid checksum length %d [%s]\n",
sum->s2length, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
--- a/match.c
+++ b/match.c
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum
done_csum2 = 1;
}
- if (memcmp(sum2,s->sums[i].sum2,s->s2length) != 0) {
+ if (memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, i), s->s2length) != 0) {
false_alarms++;
continue;
}
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum
if (i != aligned_i) {
if (sum != s->sums[aligned_i].sum1
|| l != s->sums[aligned_i].len
- || memcmp(sum2, s->sums[aligned_i].sum2, s->s2length) != 0)
+ || memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, aligned_i), s->s2length) != 0)
goto check_want_i;
i = aligned_i;
}
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum
if (sum != s->sums[i].sum1)
goto check_want_i;
get_checksum2((char *)map, l, sum2);
- if (memcmp(sum2, s->sums[i].sum2, s->s2length) != 0)
+ if (memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, i), s->s2length) != 0)
goto check_want_i;
/* OK, we have a re-alignment match. Bump the offset
* forward to the new match point. */
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum
&& (!updating_basis_file || s->sums[want_i].offset >= offset
|| s->sums[want_i].flags & SUMFLG_SAME_OFFSET)
&& sum == s->sums[want_i].sum1
- && memcmp(sum2, s->sums[want_i].sum2, s->s2length) == 0) {
+ && memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, want_i), s->s2length) == 0) {
/* we've found an adjacent match - the RLL coder
* will be happy */
i = want_i;
--- a/rsync.c
+++ b/rsync.c
@@ -437,7 +437,10 @@ int read_ndx_and_attrs(int f_in, int f_o
*/
void free_sums(struct sum_struct *s)
{
- if (s->sums) free(s->sums);
+ if (s->sums) {
+ free(s->sums);
+ free(s->sum2_array);
+ }
free(s);
}
--- a/rsync.h
+++ b/rsync.h
@@ -958,12 +958,12 @@ struct sum_buf {
uint32 sum1; /**< simple checksum */
int32 chain; /**< next hash-table collision */
short flags; /**< flag bits */
- char sum2[SUM_LENGTH]; /**< checksum */
};
struct sum_struct {
OFF_T flength; /**< total file length */
struct sum_buf *sums; /**< points to info for each chunk */
+ char *sum2_array; /**< checksums of length xfer_sum_len */
int32 count; /**< how many chunks */
int32 blength; /**< block_length */
int32 remainder; /**< flength % block_length */
@@ -982,6 +982,8 @@ struct map_struct {
int status; /* first errno from read errors */
};
+#define sum2_at(s, i) ((s)->sum2_array + ((OFF_T)(i) * xfer_sum_len))
+
#define NAME_IS_FILE (0) /* filter name as a file */
#define NAME_IS_DIR (1<<0) /* filter name as a dir */
#define NAME_IS_XATTR (1<<2) /* filter name as an xattr */
--- a/sender.c
+++ b/sender.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ extern int log_before_transfer;
extern int stdout_format_has_i;
extern int logfile_format_has_i;
extern int want_xattr_optim;
+extern int xfer_sum_len;
extern int csum_length;
extern int append_mode;
extern int copy_links;
@@ -94,10 +95,11 @@ static struct sum_struct *receive_sums(i
return(s);
s->sums = new_array(struct sum_buf, s->count);
+ s->sum2_array = new_array(char, s->count * xfer_sum_len);
for (i = 0; i < s->count; i++) {
s->sums[i].sum1 = read_int(f);
- read_buf(f, s->sums[i].sum2, s->s2length);
+ read_buf(f, sum2_at(s, i), s->s2length);
s->sums[i].offset = offset;
s->sums[i].flags = 0;

32
net/rsync/patches/002-Another-cast-when-multiplying-integers.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 42e2b56c4ede3ab164f9a5c6dae02aa84606a6c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2024 11:01:03 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Another cast when multiplying integers.
---
rsync.h | 2 +-
sender.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/rsync.h
+++ b/rsync.h
@@ -982,7 +982,7 @@ struct map_struct {
int status; /* first errno from read errors */
};
-#define sum2_at(s, i) ((s)->sum2_array + ((OFF_T)(i) * xfer_sum_len))
+#define sum2_at(s, i) ((s)->sum2_array + ((size_t)(i) * xfer_sum_len))
#define NAME_IS_FILE (0) /* filter name as a file */
#define NAME_IS_DIR (1<<0) /* filter name as a dir */
--- a/sender.c
+++ b/sender.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static struct sum_struct *receive_sums(i
return(s);
s->sums = new_array(struct sum_buf, s->count);
- s->sum2_array = new_array(char, s->count * xfer_sum_len);
+ s->sum2_array = new_array(char, (size_t)s->count * xfer_sum_len);
for (i = 0; i < s->count; i++) {
s->sums[i].sum1 = read_int(f);

22
net/rsync/patches/003-prevent-information-leak-off-the-stack.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
From 589b0691e59f761ccb05ddb8e1124991440db2c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2024 09:57:08 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] prevent information leak off the stack
prevent leak of uninitialised stack data in hash_search
---
match.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/match.c
+++ b/match.c
@@ -147,6 +147,9 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum
int more;
schar *map;
+ // prevent possible memory leaks
+ memset(sum2, 0, sizeof sum2);
+
/* want_i is used to encourage adjacent matches, allowing the RLL
* coding of the output to work more efficiently. */
want_i = 0;

32
net/rsync/patches/004-refuse-fuzzy-options-when-fuzzy-not-selected.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 8ad4b5d912fad1df29717dddaa775724da77d299 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2024 11:08:03 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] refuse fuzzy options when fuzzy not selected
this prevents a malicious server providing a file to compare to when
the user has not given the fuzzy option
---
receiver.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/receiver.c
+++ b/receiver.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ extern char sender_file_sum[MAX_DIGEST_L
extern struct file_list *cur_flist, *first_flist, *dir_flist;
extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
extern OFF_T preallocated_len;
+extern int fuzzy_basis;
extern struct name_num_item *xfer_sum_nni;
extern int xfer_sum_len;
@@ -716,6 +717,10 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char
fnamecmp = get_backup_name(fname);
break;
case FNAMECMP_FUZZY:
+ if (fuzzy_basis == 0) {
+ rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing malicious fuzzy operation for %s\n", xname);
+ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+ }
if (file->dirname) {
pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, file->dirname, xname);
fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;

98
net/rsync/patches/005-added-secure_relative_open.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
From b4a27ca25d0abb6fcf14f41b7e11f3a6e1d8a4ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2024 12:26:10 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] added secure_relative_open()
this is an open that enforces no symlink following for all path
components in a relative path
---
syscall.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 74 insertions(+)
--- a/syscall.c
+++ b/syscall.c
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#endif
+#include "ifuncs.h"
+
extern int dry_run;
extern int am_root;
extern int am_sender;
@@ -712,3 +714,75 @@ int do_open_nofollow(const char *pathnam
return fd;
}
+
+/*
+ open a file relative to a base directory. The basedir can be NULL,
+ in which case the current working directory is used. The relpath
+ must be a relative path, and the relpath must not contain any
+ elements in the path which follow symlinks (ie. like O_NOFOLLOW, but
+ applies to all path components, not just the last component)
+*/
+int secure_relative_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mode_t mode)
+{
+ if (!relpath || relpath[0] == '/') {
+ // must be a relative path
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+#if !defined(O_NOFOLLOW) || !defined(O_DIRECTORY)
+ // really old system, all we can do is live with the risks
+ if (!basedir) {
+ return open(relpath, flags, mode);
+ }
+ char fullpath[MAXPATHLEN];
+ pathjoin(fullpath, sizeof fullpath, basedir, relpath);
+ return open(fullpath, flags, mode);
+#else
+ int dirfd = AT_FDCWD;
+ if (basedir != NULL) {
+ dirfd = openat(AT_FDCWD, basedir, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY);
+ if (dirfd == -1) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ int retfd = -1;
+
+ char *path_copy = my_strdup(relpath, __FILE__, __LINE__);
+ if (!path_copy) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (const char *part = strtok(path_copy, "/");
+ part != NULL;
+ part = strtok(NULL, "/"))
+ {
+ int next_fd = openat(dirfd, part, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW);
+ if (next_fd == -1 && errno == ENOTDIR) {
+ if (strtok(NULL, "/") != NULL) {
+ // this is not the last component of the path
+ errno = ELOOP;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ // this could be the last component of the path, try as a file
+ retfd = openat(dirfd, part, flags | O_NOFOLLOW, mode);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (next_fd == -1) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (dirfd != AT_FDCWD) close(dirfd);
+ dirfd = next_fd;
+ }
+
+ // the path must be a directory
+ errno = EINVAL;
+
+cleanup:
+ free(path_copy);
+ if (dirfd != AT_FDCWD) {
+ close(dirfd);
+ }
+ return retfd;
+#endif // O_NOFOLLOW, O_DIRECTORY
+}

98
net/rsync/patches/006-receiver-use-secure_relative_open-for-basis-file.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
From c35e28331f10ba6eba370611abd78bde32d54da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2024 12:28:13 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] receiver: use secure_relative_open() for basis file
this prevents attacks where the basis file is manipulated by a
malicious sender to gain information about files outside the
destination tree
---
receiver.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
--- a/receiver.c
+++ b/receiver.c
@@ -552,6 +552,8 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char
progress_init();
while (1) {
+ const char *basedir = NULL;
+
cleanup_disable();
/* This call also sets cur_flist. */
@@ -722,27 +724,29 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
if (file->dirname) {
- pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, file->dirname, xname);
- fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
- } else
- fnamecmp = xname;
+ basedir = file->dirname;
+ }
+ fnamecmp = xname;
break;
default:
if (fnamecmp_type > FNAMECMP_FUZZY && fnamecmp_type-FNAMECMP_FUZZY <= basis_dir_cnt) {
fnamecmp_type -= FNAMECMP_FUZZY + 1;
if (file->dirname) {
- stringjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf,
- basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], "/", file->dirname, "/", xname, NULL);
- } else
- pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], xname);
+ pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], file->dirname);
+ basedir = fnamecmpbuf;
+ } else {
+ basedir = basis_dir[fnamecmp_type];
+ }
+ fnamecmp = xname;
} else if (fnamecmp_type >= basis_dir_cnt) {
rprintf(FERROR,
"invalid basis_dir index: %d.\n",
fnamecmp_type);
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
- } else
- pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], fname);
- fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
+ } else {
+ basedir = basis_dir[fnamecmp_type];
+ fnamecmp = fname;
+ }
break;
}
if (!fnamecmp || (daemon_filter_list.head
@@ -765,7 +769,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char
}
/* open the file */
- fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
+ fd1 = secure_relative_open(basedir, fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd1 == -1 && protocol_version < 29) {
if (fnamecmp != fname) {
@@ -776,14 +780,20 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char
if (fd1 == -1 && basis_dir[0]) {
/* pre-29 allowed only one alternate basis */
- pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf,
- basis_dir[0], fname);
- fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
+ basedir = basis_dir[0];
+ fnamecmp = fname;
fnamecmp_type = FNAMECMP_BASIS_DIR_LOW;
- fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
+ fd1 = secure_relative_open(basedir, fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
}
}
+ if (basedir) {
+ // for the following code we need the full
+ // path name as a single string
+ pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basedir, fnamecmp);
+ fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
+ }
+
one_inplace = inplace_partial && fnamecmp_type == FNAMECMP_PARTIAL_DIR;
updating_basis_or_equiv = one_inplace
|| (inplace && (fnamecmp == fname || fnamecmp_type == FNAMECMP_BACKUP));

32
net/rsync/patches/007-disallow-elements-in-relpath-for-secure_relative_open.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 9f86ddc9652247233f32b241a79d5aa4fb9d4afa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2024 09:16:31 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] disallow ../ elements in relpath for secure_relative_open
---
syscall.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/syscall.c
+++ b/syscall.c
@@ -721,6 +721,8 @@ int do_open_nofollow(const char *pathnam
must be a relative path, and the relpath must not contain any
elements in the path which follow symlinks (ie. like O_NOFOLLOW, but
applies to all path components, not just the last component)
+
+ The relpath must also not contain any ../ elements in the path
*/
int secure_relative_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mode_t mode)
{
@@ -729,6 +731,11 @@ int secure_relative_open(const char *bas
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
+ if (strncmp(relpath, "../", 3) == 0 || strstr(relpath, "/../")) {
+ // no ../ elements allowed in the relpath
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return -1;
+ }
#if !defined(O_NOFOLLOW) || !defined(O_DIRECTORY)
// really old system, all we can do is live with the risks

38
net/rsync/patches/008-Refuse-a-duplicate-dirlist.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
From 688f5c379a433038bde36897a156d589be373a98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2024 15:46:50 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Refuse a duplicate dirlist.
---
flist.c | 9 +++++++++
rsync.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
--- a/flist.c
+++ b/flist.c
@@ -2584,6 +2584,15 @@ struct file_list *recv_file_list(int f,
init_hard_links();
#endif
+ if (inc_recurse && dir_ndx >= 0) {
+ struct file_struct *file = dir_flist->files[dir_ndx];
+ if (file->flags & FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST) {
+ rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing malicious duplicate flist for dir %d\n", dir_ndx);
+ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+ }
+ file->flags |= FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST;
+ }
+
flist = flist_new(0, "recv_file_list");
flist_expand(flist, FLIST_START_LARGE);
--- a/rsync.h
+++ b/rsync.h
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
#define FLAG_DUPLICATE (1<<4) /* sender */
#define FLAG_MISSING_DIR (1<<4) /* generator */
#define FLAG_HLINKED (1<<5) /* receiver/generator (checked on all types) */
+#define FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST (1<<5)/* sender/receiver/generator - dir_flist only */
#define FLAG_HLINK_FIRST (1<<6) /* receiver/generator (w/FLAG_HLINKED) */
#define FLAG_IMPLIED_DIR (1<<6) /* sender/receiver/generator (dirs only) */
#define FLAG_HLINK_LAST (1<<7) /* receiver/generator */

31
net/rsync/patches/009-Fix-FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST-collission-with-FLAG_HLINKED.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From 996af4a79f9afe4d7158ecdd87c78cee382c6b39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 15:10:24 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST collission with FLAG_HLINKED
fixes commit 688f5c379a43 (Refuse a duplicate dirlist.)
Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/702
Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/697
---
rsync.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/rsync.h
+++ b/rsync.h
@@ -84,7 +84,6 @@
#define FLAG_DUPLICATE (1<<4) /* sender */
#define FLAG_MISSING_DIR (1<<4) /* generator */
#define FLAG_HLINKED (1<<5) /* receiver/generator (checked on all types) */
-#define FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST (1<<5)/* sender/receiver/generator - dir_flist only */
#define FLAG_HLINK_FIRST (1<<6) /* receiver/generator (w/FLAG_HLINKED) */
#define FLAG_IMPLIED_DIR (1<<6) /* sender/receiver/generator (dirs only) */
#define FLAG_HLINK_LAST (1<<7) /* receiver/generator */
@@ -93,6 +92,7 @@
#define FLAG_SKIP_GROUP (1<<10) /* receiver/generator */
#define FLAG_TIME_FAILED (1<<11)/* generator */
#define FLAG_MOD_NSEC (1<<12) /* sender/receiver/generator */
+#define FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST (1<<13)/* sender/receiver/generator - dir_flist only */
/* These flags are passed to functions but not stored. */

22
net/rsync/patches/010-range-check-dir_ndx-before-use.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
From 344327385fa47fa5bb67a32c237735e6240cfb93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2024 16:12:45 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] range check dir_ndx before use
---
flist.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/flist.c
+++ b/flist.c
@@ -2585,6 +2585,10 @@ struct file_list *recv_file_list(int f,
#endif
if (inc_recurse && dir_ndx >= 0) {
+ if (dir_ndx >= dir_flist->used) {
+ rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing invalid dir_ndx %u >= %u\n", dir_ndx, dir_flist->used);
+ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+ }
struct file_struct *file = dir_flist->files[dir_ndx];
if (file->flags & FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST) {
rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing malicious duplicate flist for dir %d\n", dir_ndx);

126
net/rsync/patches/011-make-safe-links-stricter.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
From 407c71c7ce562137230e8ba19149c81ccc47c387 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2024 15:15:53 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] make --safe-links stricter
when --safe-links is used also reject links where a '../' component is
included in the destination as other than the leading part of the
filename
---
testsuite/safe-links.test | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
testsuite/unsafe-byname.test | 2 +-
util1.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 testsuite/safe-links.test
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testsuite/safe-links.test
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
+
+test_symlink() {
+ is_a_link "$1" || test_fail "File $1 is not a symlink"
+}
+
+test_regular() {
+ if [ ! -f "$1" ]; then
+ test_fail "File $1 is not regular file or not exists"
+ fi
+}
+
+test_notexist() {
+ if [ -e "$1" ]; then
+ test_fail "File $1 exists"
+ fi
+ if [ -h "$1" ]; then
+ test_fail "File $1 exists as a symlink"
+ fi
+}
+
+cd "$tmpdir"
+
+mkdir from
+
+mkdir "from/safe"
+mkdir "from/unsafe"
+
+mkdir "from/safe/files"
+mkdir "from/safe/links"
+
+touch "from/safe/files/file1"
+touch "from/safe/files/file2"
+touch "from/unsafe/unsafefile"
+
+ln -s ../files/file1 "from/safe/links/"
+ln -s ../files/file2 "from/safe/links/"
+ln -s ../../unsafe/unsafefile "from/safe/links/"
+ln -s a/a/a/../../../unsafe2 "from/safe/links/"
+
+#echo "LISTING FROM"
+#ls -lR from
+
+echo "rsync with relative path and just -a"
+$RSYNC -avv --safe-links from/safe/ to
+
+#echo "LISTING TO"
+#ls -lR to
+
+test_symlink to/links/file1
+test_symlink to/links/file2
+test_notexist to/links/unsafefile
+test_notexist to/links/unsafe2
--- a/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test
+++ b/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ test_unsafe ..//../dest from/dir uns
test_unsafe .. from/file safe
test_unsafe ../.. from/file unsafe
test_unsafe ..//.. from//file unsafe
-test_unsafe dir/.. from safe
+test_unsafe dir/.. from unsafe
test_unsafe dir/../.. from unsafe
test_unsafe dir/..//.. from unsafe
--- a/util1.c
+++ b/util1.c
@@ -1318,7 +1318,14 @@ int handle_partial_dir(const char *fname
*
* "src" is the top source directory currently applicable at the level
* of the referenced symlink. This is usually the symlink's full path
- * (including its name), as referenced from the root of the transfer. */
+ * (including its name), as referenced from the root of the transfer.
+ *
+ * NOTE: this also rejects dest names with a .. component in other
+ * than the first component of the name ie. it rejects names such as
+ * a/b/../x/y. This needs to be done as the leading subpaths 'a' or
+ * 'b' could later be replaced with symlinks such as a link to '.'
+ * resulting in the link being transferred now becoming unsafe
+ */
int unsafe_symlink(const char *dest, const char *src)
{
const char *name, *slash;
@@ -1328,6 +1335,23 @@ int unsafe_symlink(const char *dest, con
if (!dest || !*dest || *dest == '/')
return 1;
+ // reject destinations with /../ in the name other than at the start of the name
+ const char *dest2 = dest;
+ while (strncmp(dest2, "../", 3) == 0) {
+ dest2 += 3;
+ while (*dest2 == '/') {
+ // allow for ..//..///../foo
+ dest2++;
+ }
+ }
+ if (strstr(dest2, "/../"))
+ return 1;
+
+ // reject if the destination ends in /..
+ const size_t dlen = strlen(dest);
+ if (dlen > 3 && strcmp(&dest[dlen-3], "/..") == 0)
+ return 1;
+
/* find out what our safety margin is */
for (name = src; (slash = strchr(name, '/')) != 0; name = slash+1) {
/* ".." segment starts the count over. "." segment is ignored. */

164
net/rsync/patches/012-fixed-symlink-race-condition-in-sender.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
From 0590b09d9a34ae72741b91ec0708a820650198b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2024 08:59:42 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] fixed symlink race condition in sender
when we open a file that we don't expect to be a symlink use
O_NOFOLLOW to prevent a race condition where an attacker could change
a file between being a normal file and a symlink
---
checksum.c | 2 +-
flist.c | 2 +-
generator.c | 4 ++--
receiver.c | 2 +-
sender.c | 2 +-
syscall.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
t_unsafe.c | 3 +++
tls.c | 3 +++
trimslash.c | 2 ++
util1.c | 2 +-
10 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/checksum.c
+++ b/checksum.c
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ void file_checksum(const char *fname, co
int32 remainder;
int fd;
- fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
+ fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
if (fd == -1) {
memset(sum, 0, file_sum_len);
return;
--- a/flist.c
+++ b/flist.c
@@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ struct file_struct *make_file(const char
if (copy_devices && am_sender && IS_DEVICE(st.st_mode)) {
if (st.st_size == 0) {
- int fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
+ int fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
if (fd >= 0) {
st.st_size = get_device_size(fd, fname);
close(fd);
--- a/generator.c
+++ b/generator.c
@@ -1798,7 +1798,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname,
if (write_devices && IS_DEVICE(sx.st.st_mode) && sx.st.st_size == 0) {
/* This early open into fd skips the regular open below. */
- if ((fd = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0)) >= 0)
+ if ((fd = do_open_nofollow(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY)) >= 0)
real_sx.st.st_size = sx.st.st_size = get_device_size(fd, fnamecmp);
}
@@ -1867,7 +1867,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname,
}
/* open the file */
- if (fd < 0 && (fd = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) {
+ if (fd < 0 && (fd = do_open_checklinks(fnamecmp)) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to open %s, continuing",
full_fname(fnamecmp));
pretend_missing:
--- a/receiver.c
+++ b/receiver.c
@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char
if (fnamecmp != fname) {
fnamecmp = fname;
fnamecmp_type = FNAMECMP_FNAME;
- fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
+ fd1 = do_open_nofollow(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY);
}
if (fd1 == -1 && basis_dir[0]) {
--- a/sender.c
+++ b/sender.c
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
- fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
+ fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
if (fd == -1) {
if (errno == ENOENT) {
enum logcode c = am_daemon && protocol_version < 28 ? FERROR : FWARNING;
--- a/syscall.c
+++ b/syscall.c
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ extern int preallocate_files;
extern int preserve_perms;
extern int preserve_executability;
extern int open_noatime;
+extern int copy_links;
+extern int copy_unsafe_links;
#ifndef S_BLKSIZE
# if defined hpux || defined __hpux__ || defined __hpux
@@ -793,3 +795,21 @@ cleanup:
return retfd;
#endif // O_NOFOLLOW, O_DIRECTORY
}
+
+/*
+ varient of do_open/do_open_nofollow which does do_open() if the
+ copy_links or copy_unsafe_links options are set and does
+ do_open_nofollow() otherwise
+
+ This is used to prevent a race condition where an attacker could be
+ switching a file between being a symlink and being a normal file
+
+ The open is always done with O_RDONLY flags
+ */
+int do_open_checklinks(const char *pathname)
+{
+ if (copy_links || copy_unsafe_links) {
+ return do_open(pathname, O_RDONLY, 0);
+ }
+ return do_open_nofollow(pathname, O_RDONLY);
+}
--- a/t_unsafe.c
+++ b/t_unsafe.c
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ int am_root = 0;
int am_sender = 1;
int read_only = 0;
int list_only = 0;
+int copy_links = 0;
+int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
+
short info_levels[COUNT_INFO], debug_levels[COUNT_DEBUG];
int
--- a/tls.c
+++ b/tls.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ int list_only = 0;
int link_times = 0;
int link_owner = 0;
int nsec_times = 0;
+int safe_symlinks = 0;
+int copy_links = 0;
+int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
#ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS
--- a/trimslash.c
+++ b/trimslash.c
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ int am_root = 0;
int am_sender = 1;
int read_only = 1;
int list_only = 0;
+int copy_links = 0;
+int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
--- a/util1.c
+++ b/util1.c
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const
int len; /* Number of bytes read into `buf'. */
OFF_T prealloc_len = 0, offset = 0;
- if ((ifd = do_open(source, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) {
+ if ((ifd = do_open_nofollow(source, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
int save_errno = errno;
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "open %s", full_fname(source));
errno = save_errno;

21
net/rsync/patches/013-raise-protocol-version-to-32.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
From 536ae3f4efbcd95bee1f9794bbeceb50ba5f0dba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2024 13:34:01 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] raise protocol version to 32
make it easier to spot unpatched servers
---
rsync.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/rsync.h
+++ b/rsync.h
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@
/* Update this if you make incompatible changes and ALSO update the
* SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION if it is not a final (official) release. */
-#define PROTOCOL_VERSION 31
+#define PROTOCOL_VERSION 32
/* This is used when working on a new protocol version or for any unofficial
* protocol tweaks. It should be a non-zero value for each pre-release repo

29
net/rsync/patches/014-Fix-use-after-free-in-generator.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
From 81ead9e70c7b9ee1bf3d1df09ace7df95934c5b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 15:48:04 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix use-after-free in generator
full_fname() will free the return value in the next call so we need to
duplicate it before passing it to rsyserr.
Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/704
---
generator.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/generator.c
+++ b/generator.c
@@ -2041,8 +2041,12 @@ int atomic_create(struct file_struct *fi
if (!skip_atomic) {
if (do_rename(tmpname, fname) < 0) {
+ char *full_tmpname = strdup(full_fname(tmpname));
+ if (full_tmpname == NULL)
+ out_of_memory("atomic_create");
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "rename %s -> \"%s\" failed",
- full_fname(tmpname), full_fname(fname));
+ full_tmpname, full_fname(fname));
+ free(full_tmpname);
do_unlink(tmpname);
return 0;
}